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The telecommunications industry in Israel has changed significantly in recent
years. This paper examines key issues that will arise in Israel as a result of these
major changes and argues that the major changes in the telecommunications
industry require significant changes in the regulatory structure. The paper first
provides background material on the current structure in the various segments of
the telecommunications industry in Israel. The paper then discusses the current
regulatory environment and makes recommendations regarding the future
regulatory structure in Israel and the scope for regulation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, telecommunications was a highly regulated sector in nearly every country in
the world. Most developed countries pursued deregulatory policies in the 1990s in order to
introduce competition into the telecommunications industry. In the U.S., the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed to promote competition by encouraging the
entry of local exchange carriers (LECs), inter-exchange carriers (IXCs), and cable television
firms into each other’s markets. Similarly, the European Council adopted a resolution requiring
‘equal access’ by 2000.
1
Recent significant changes in the sector have ushered in a new era of competition in Israel’s
telecommunications industry. In 1999 there was a major (structural) rebalancing of regulated
tariffs. The tariff rebalancing reduced the cross-subsidies inherent in the system and made the
tariffs much more transparent. In 2001 the Knesset enacted the Communications Act.
2 The
passing of this Act, which includes telecommunications as well as broadcasting, is one of the
most significant changes in the Israeli telecoms sector since the formation of Bezeq in 1984.
In theory, the act will permit competition in telecommunications and video to the home services,
with both fields open, not just to a limited number of licensees, but also to all firms that meet
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certain conditions.
Thus, the telecommunications industry in Israel has changed considerably. The goal of this
paper is to examine key issues that will arise in Israel as a result of these changes and to argue
that they require significant changes in the industry’s regulatory structure.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide background material on the
current structure of the various sectors of Israel’s telecommunications industry. In section 3, I
discuss the current regulatory environment and make recommendations regarding the future
regulatory structure in Israel and the role of regulation. Section 4 provides brief conclusions.
2. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY IN ISRAEL
Up until twenty years ago, all telecommunications services in Israel were provided exclusively
by the Ministry of Communications. In 1979, the government decided to establish a
government-owned company that would be responsible for providing telecommunications
services in Israel. Formal reform began with the Telecommunications Act of 1982, which
established Bezeq, the government-owned corporation. Bezeq replaced the Ministry of
Communications as the provider of telecommunications services in 1984.
3 Since then
competition has been introduced in most sectors as Table 1 shows.
The size of the telecommunications market in Israel grew from approximately $ 3.5 billion
per year in 1997 to $ 5.0 billion per year in 2000 (see Table 2). The table shows that the
Table 1
Firms Providing Telecommunications Services, by Sector, 1993 and 2002
Service 1993 2003
Cellular Pelephone Pelephone
Cellcom
Partner
MIRS
International Bezeq Bezeq International
Barak
Golden Lines
Fixed wireline Bezeq Bezeq
Video-to-the-home
(VTTH) service CATV CATV
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)
Internet service
provision None 4 major Internet service providers
and many smaller providers
3 Currently the Israeli government owns approximately 54 percent of the company. The government plans
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cellular sector grew especially quickly. In 1997, cellular service accounted for 27 percent of
industry revenues. By 2000, the cellular sector accounted for fully 49 percent of industry
revenues.
I briefly describe the changes in the various telecommunications sectors.
a. Domestic wireline telephony
Bezeq still provides exclusive voice service for all local and intercity calls in Israel. Despite
the fact that Bezeq has remained a monopoly on this service, there have been significant
improvements in the provision of this service over the last twenty years. Recent changes in
the tariff structure were implemented in 1999 and 2000.
The general level of Bezeq’s tariffs as well as end-user and interconnection rates were
determined by a 1998 tariffs committee, and are based on a detailed cost study as well as on
principles about how to allocate common and joint costs.
4 The committee first determined
Bezeq’s total ‘recognized’ costs. In order to determine the individual tariffs, the committee
adopted the principle that prices (tariffs) for telecommunications services should be based on
the forward-looking long-run incremental cost (LRIC) of the service.
5 The committee estimated
LRIC by the capital cost associated with each service. The committee used direct costs as an
approximation for long-run incremental costs.
6 Using this methodology and the Bezeq data,
the committee estimated that direct costs (or LRICs) accounted for 63.5 percent of Bezeq’s
total network costs. Hence joint and common costs accounted for 36.5 percent of Bezeq’s
total costs.
The committee adopted two principles in allocating the common and joint costs. (i) There
should be no cross subsidy between services. This meant that tariffs must be set so that the
Table 2
Telecommunications Revenue, by Sector
Sector Revenue ($ mill.) 1997 Revenue ($ mill.) 2000
Domestic wireline 1,470 1,600
Cellular 945 2,450
International 455 350
Video-to-the-home (VTTH) 455 400
Internet service 35 125
Other 175 75
Total 3,535 5,000
SOURCE: Ministry of Communications.
4 The report is available at the Ministry of Communications’ website at http://www.moc.gov.il.
5 Tariffs cannot, however, be set equal to long run incremental costs because there are common and joint
costs in the network.
6 For discussion of the approximation, see pages 39–41 of the full report on the website of the Ministry of
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total revenue from the service (i.e., telephony) will cover all of its direct costs, common costs
and joint costs. (ii) There should be no cross subsidy within a service. This meant that each
part of the service had to cover at least its LRIC.
The committee recommended setting the monthly access and connection charges so that
they would exactly cover LRIC, but not include any of the common and joint costs of telephony.
Hence, the common and joint telephony costs were divided among the (end-user and
interconnection) traffic components. The committee used weights of 1.0 (full allocation of
joint and common costs) for calls that originate and are completed on Bezeq’s network and
0.5 (partial allocation) for interconnection calls. This made sense, since interconnection calls
are carried partially on the Bezeq network and partially on the cellular network or international
network.
The committee calculated that, given the revenue requirements, there would have to be an
overhead on end-user traffic of 220 percent (i.e., the price should be 3.2 times LRIC), and an
overhead on interconnect traffic of 110 percent (i.e., the price should be 2.1 times LRIC). This
recommendation led to a significant reduction in these tariffs because the old rates had higher
mark-ups over LRIC.
The committee’s report was issued in September 1998. In March 1999, the government
approved the recommendations of the committee; they were then implemented in April 1999.
The following key changes were implemented:
• Overall tariffs were reduced by approximately 10 percent.
• Access (monthly service) & connection rates increased by approximately 10 percent.
• End-user traffic rates fell by 20 percent.
• Interconnect rates were made (i) uniform across carriers, (ii) a function of distance (similar
to other domestic calls), and (iii) lowered by approximately 60 percent on average.
7
By implementing the committee’s recommendations, the government eliminated the cross
subsidy from access to traffic. Before the committee rebalanced the tariffs, interconnection
rates were considerably higher in Israel than in the U.S. and Europe and the interconnection
rates did not explicitly depend on whether the calls were handed out to Bezeq in the local area
code or whether intercity transport in the Bezeq network was required. The committee thus
explicitly linked interconnection rates to interconnection costs.
The 1998 committee recommended that the tariff structure be simplified because the 3x3
matrix
8 made tariffs unnecessarily complicated. During the 2000-2003 period, the tariff matrix
was indeed greatly simplified by the Ministry of Communications, so that there is now a
single type of call (effectively a single area code for the whole country) and two periods of
time-sensitive pricing: peak and off-peak, i.e., a 2x1 matrix. During the same period, the
counting unit was replaced by per second billing in the fixed network, with a minimum charge
of approximately 4.89 U.S. cents per call.
9
Table 3 shows the current rate structure for wireline tariffs in Israel, as well as the rate
structure proposed by a 2002 tariffs committee that recently made its recommendations public.
7 Since the cost of interconnection depends on whether the call uses just Bezeq’s local network or Bezeq’s
intercity network, the 1998 tariffs committee recommended that there be an equivalent matrix for interconnection
calls, identical to that for end-user traffic.
8 The 3x3 matrix included 3 types of phone calls: local, within area code, between area code, and time-
sensitive prices—peak, interim period, off-peak.
9 Per second billing already existed in all other sectors of the industry. In other sectors there is no minimum
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In addition to the recommended tariffs shown in Table 3, the 2002 committee recommended
that the minimum charge per call be eliminated.
b. Wireless (cellular) telephony
In 1986, Bezeq (in partnership with Motorola) began offering cellular phone service. The
company (called Pelephone) is now a fully owned Bezeq subsidiary. In 1994, an additional
cellular license was awarded to Cellcom. The number of cellular lines increased dramatically
during the 1995-1997 period as a result of the relatively inexpensive cellular prices that Cellcom
committed to in the auction. By the end of 1997, there were approximately 1.8 million cellular
subscribers split equally between the two providers. A third license was awarded to Partner in
1999. By 2002 there were more than 5.5 million cell phones in use in Israel.
Table 4 shows the total number of Land-to-Land, Land-to-Mobile, Mobile-to-Land, and
Mobile-to-Mobile minutes in 1997, 1999, and 2001. By 2001, Mobile-to-Mobile calls accounted
for nearly 24 percent of total ‘network’ minutes.
10
c. International telephone service
Table 3
Tariffs for Calls Originating and Terminating in
the Bezeq Network
Current rates Proposed rates
(US cents per minute) (US cents per minute)
Peak time 7:00-19:00 3.04 2.80
Off-peak 19:00-7:00 0.54 1.28
Table 4
Wireline and Wireless Traffic, in Millions of
Minutes
1997  1999 2001
Land-to-land 18,788 18,664 17,131
Land-to-mobile 1,839 2,656 3,692
Mobile-to-land 1,880 2,457 2,911
Mobile-to-mobile 1,161 2,928 7,352
Total network minutes 23,668 26,705 31,086
SOURCE: 2003 MOC Comittee, p.5, and sources cited therein.
11
Until 1997 Bezeq provided all international services. Beginning in July 1997, two additional
firms (Barak and Golden Lines) began providing international telephone service. Bezeq
International, which is a fully owned subsidiary of Bezeq is the third international provider.
Following the introduction of competition into the provision of international telephone
service, rates fell by 60–80 percent. Bezeq International’s share of this traffic fell from 100
10 The table does not include Internet minutes, which totaled 13,984 million in 2002.
11 The 1997 numbers are estimates.ISRAEL ECONOMIC REVIEW 2 106
percent to less than 60 percent during the first three months of competition.
The dramatic fall in prices led to a huge growth in outgoing international phone calls.
Between 1995 and 2001, outgoing international traffic grew from 266 million minutes to
1,120 million minutes, an increase of 321 percent. During the same period, incoming calls
grew from 419 million minutes to 728 million minutes, an increase of 74 percent.
d. Video-to-the Home (VTTH) services
A 1986 decree and subsequent amendments to the Telecommunications Act of 1982 led to the
establishment of a cable television industry in Israel. Several mergers and consolidations left
the industry with three regional (monopoly) operators by the end of the 1990s.
Cable service reaches 90 percent of all households. The penetration rate, i.e., the number
of subscribers/homes passed, is quite high and there were approximately 1.2 million subscribers
at the end of 2002.
Recently the government provided a general license for direct broadcast satellite service in
Israel. The YES firm began providing VTTH services in competition with the incumbent
cable industry in 2001.
e. Internet sector
The Internet sector in Israel grew more slowly than might have been expected during the
1990s. This was due, in part, to the fact that all local phone calls, including calls to Internet
service providers, were metered. Nevertheless, by 2002, there were more than 2 million Internet
subscribers.
A recent change allowed consumers to pay a single price for unlimited Internet access.
There are now four major Internet service providers (ISPs) and more than 60 additional ISPs.
Additionally, broadband Internet access was introduced in Israel in 2001. By 2002, there were
100,000 ADSL subscribers in Israel and 15,000 cable modem subscribers. (Source: MOC at
http://www.moc.gov.il/new/english/index.html, accessed on May 1, 2003.)
3. CHANGES IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: FROM A
GOVERNMENT MINISTRY TO AN INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY
The regulatory environment is critical because it sets the rules of the game, that is, it defines
the way in which firms can or cannot compete. There is a need for clear and coherent rules.
But the environment is dynamic, in part because of rapid technological change, but also in
part because the process of adopting rules changes as well. It is critical that firms be familiar
with these rules and procedures because they must undertake strategic decisions (that are
often irreversible) based on these rules.
Hence a firm not only faces challenges in responding to changing market conditions, it
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in the future. In the case of the latter, there is additional (unnecessary) uncertainty because the
regulatory process in the Israeli telecommunications industry has been characterized by a
sequence of ad-hoc committees that address different issues. Some committees set prices and
tariffs, while other committees address changes in market structure, i.e. permitting entry into
a particular sector, etc. An impressive list of committees and their reports can be found on the
Ministry of Communications web page at http://www.moc.gov.il.
A similar regulatory process existed in the Israeli electricity industry. Prior to the
establishment of the Electricity Public Utility Authority in 1996, a series of ad-hoc committees
periodically reviewed and set electricity prices. The regulatory authority now handles all aspects
of regulation in the provision of electricity including production, transmission and distribution
and is dedicated to the ongoing regulation of the electricity industry.
12
The establishment of the Electricity Public Utility Authority is part of the process of
regulatory reform that has taken place in the last few years. Another example is the establishment
of the Israeli Antitrust Authority, whose mandate is to encourage competition. Although Israel
has always had antitrust laws, these laws were administered by a unit of the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce prior to the establishment of the Antitrust Authority. Antitrust policy
had little impact, however, until the Authority was established as an independent government
authority in 1994.
It seems inevitable that similar regulatory reform must take place in the Israeli
telecommunications industry of well. Like the electricity industry, external committees
appointed by the Ministry of Communications have typically updated tariffs and implemented
policy. While one could argue that these committees have been composed of experts and that
the policies adopted by the committees have been reasonable, the rotating committee structure
is not satisfactory as a long-term regulatory solution. This is because the dynamics in the
telecommunications industry require regulators to respond to market changes on an ongoing
basis.
Hence, it seems clear that there is a need to establish an independent telecommunications
authority in Israel like the U.S. FCC (or Oftel in the U.K.) that will specialize in the ongoing
regulation of the telecommunications industry.
a. The external regulatory committees
The external committees that have played a key role in telecommunications regulation in
Israel can be divided into two types:
• Committees that set prices and tariffs, such as the 1993 Tariffs Committee, the 1998 Tariffs
Committee, and the 2002 Tariffs Committee.
• Committees that focus on competition policy, such as the Competition Policy Committees
of 1998 and 2002. The mandate of these committees included regulating market structure
issues, such as entry and merger policy, etc.
This dichotomy warrants examination. It was clearly not planned, but simply evolved in
response to regulatory needs. However, the issues of pricing and competition policy are
12 For more details, see their web page at http://www.pua.gov.il/frame.html.ISRAEL ECONOMIC REVIEW 2 108
inherently interrelated. The setting of prices includes the pricing of usage of different aspects
of the infrastructure and various interconnection fees. These prices, to a large degree, determine
market structure. For example, setting the interconnection fees at inappropriate levels (either
too high or too low) results in transfers from one segment of the market to another segment,
making entry more attractive in one sector and less attractive in other sectors as well as creating
the possibility for arbitrage opportunities. An appropriate regulatory regime would regulate
prices and competition policy in a consistent and coherent fashion.
b. The current regulatory structure in Israel
There are several different regulatory models. These models typically vary in their degree of
independence. One possible model is the U.S. FCC. The FCC is an independent commission.
At the other end of the spectrum, regulation is handled directly by a government ministry.
Israel falls in this category. The following table provides different regulatory models with
varying degrees of independence.
13
Table 5
Four Regulatory Models
Models Countries Degree of independence
Autonomous, semi-
judicial commission US, Canada High
Independent official
and office UK Variable
Independent official
within Ministry France Medium
Government Ministry Japan, Germany
Israel Low
SOURCE: (Except Israel), Gillick (1992).
c. The future regulatory structure and the role of regulation
The current regulatory structure (government ministry) was put in place when Bezeq was a
government-owned company providing all telecommunications services in Israel. Since then,
several major changes have occurred in the industry:
• Many sectors (such as the international and cellular sectors) have evolved from regulated
monopolies to partially regulated oligopolies.
• Convergence of telecommunications, cable television, and broadcast industries. In July
2001, the Knesset enacted the 2001 Communications Act. In theory, the Act will permit
competition in telecommunications and Video-to-the-Home services, with both fields open
not just to a limited number of licensees but to all firms that meet the conditions.
Although the changes probably mean less price regulation of end-user rates in the future,
the regulatory questions are more difficult. Additionally, there is an increased importance of a
level playing field (determining interconnection rates, insuring interoperability among
networks, etc.). Hence, there is a need for a change in the regulatory structure itself.
13 Source: (except Israel), Gillick (1992).TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN ISRAEL 109
In order to ensure that evolution to a market-based telecommunications industry will benefit
the society as a whole, a single independent regulatory body should be responsible for all
telecommunications regulation.
Assuming that most markets will be opened up to competition, the goal of regulation will
be to ensure that fair competition exists. A key regulatory task will be to set the appropriate
charges for use of the infrastructure. Other important regulatory functions include ensuring
interconnection arrangements among competitors, setting technical standards where
appropriate, and allocating the spectrum. We now discuss some key issues that are likely to
arise in the near era of competition:
a. Inter-operability and open access: The Communications Act of 2001 tries to insure a
separation between companies that sell infrastructure/telecommunications services and those
that transmit broadcasts/content; convergence in these industries may make it very difficult to
enforce separation. Although the 2001 Communications Act leaves the jurisdiction issue of
boundaries between telecom and broadcasting to the Ministry of Communications, it is not
clear how a distinction can be made between these services. The inter-operability and open-
access conditions imposed on the AOL/Time Warner merger in the U.S. illustrate the types of
issues that might arise in Israel.
14
b. Facilities-based competition vs. unbundling of network elements: Several years ago Israel’s
government decided that competition in the telecommunications industry would be ‘facilities-
based’ competition, rather than competition that would require Bezeq to unbundle network
elements such as the local loop and sell them to potential rivals. While facilities competition
has many positive aspects to it once it gets off the ground, the problem is getting the process
going. Attempts to jump-start the process have by and large not been successful in Israel,
although an upgraded cable system might eventually provide an alternative infrastructure for
providing telecommunications services. The authorities may have to consider the possibility
of selective unbundling of network elements. This requires setting access prices for network
elements. There are disagreements in the literature about how to address this issue (see Laffont
and Tirole, 2001).
These issues require ongoing regulation rather than a series of ad-hoc committees. The
importance of ongoing regulation applies to prices as well as competition-policy issues and
can be illustrated by examining the regulation of interconnection tariffs in Israel, that is, the
tariffs that international and cellular firms pay to Bezeq for the completion of calls to and
from their network to Bezeq’s (fixed) wireline network.
d. An example: the regulation of interconnection tariffs
Competition has led to new entrants in both the cellular and international sectors of the market.
The introduction of competition means that calls often originate in one network and terminate
in another one. This typically requires inter-carrier compensation schemes. These compensation
schemes generally involve access/interconnection charges. As a consequence, the determination
of access/interconnection charges is one of the most important issues in enabling competition
in industries such as telecommunications and electricity where (i) there are essential facilities
and (ii) these facilities are monopolized due to first mover advantages, economies of scale, or
regulation.
The regulation of interconnection rates illustrates the need for coherent and continuous
regulation. The 1998 Tariffs Committee determined interconnection rates based on a
14 See Faulhaber (2001) for details.ISRAEL ECONOMIC REVIEW 2 110
methodology it had developed, and it explained the logic of the recommended tariffs. Although
this committee set interconnection rates based on a clearly stated policy, a second tariffs
committee was formed in 2002; one of its tasks was to determine interconnection rates. Why
was there a need for a second committee? One can say that it was due only to changes in
market conditions, i.e., changes in cost conditions, in demand etc. This is true in part; however,
there was some disagreement as to how the interconnection tariffs should change as a result of
the changes in the structure (reduction in the matrix) of Bezeq’s end-user tariffs. Careful
reading of the findings of the 1998 Tariffs Committee report indicates that several changes
proposed by the Ministry of Communications (see below) were not necessarily in the spirit of
the committee’s report.
When the 1998 committee made its calculations, there was a 3x3 matrix for end user rates.
In subsequent years, the Ministry of Communications changed the Bezeq tariffs as follows:
the end-user matrix was reduced, first to a 2x2 matrix with two time-of-day categories (peak
and off-peak) and two geographic categories (within area code & between area codes), and
then to a 2x1 matrix, when a unified peak-time tariff for end-user rates was adopted throughout
the country.
The Ministry of Communications then proposed a unified peak-time tariff for interconnection
rates as well. Such a policy, however, was inconsistent with the 1998 Tariffs Committee’s
recommendations because it would have unlinked interconnection rates and interconnection
costs. In the end, the MOC did not enact the proposed policy and left the determination of
Interconnection rates to the second tariffs committee. Coherent and continuous regulation in
the framework of an independent authority would probably reduce the uncertainty associated
with interconnection policy.
4. CONCLUSION
It seems inevitable that an independent telecommunications regulatory authority will be created.
The last three Ministers of Communications have expressed support for an independent
regulatory authority. Indeed, on August 20, 2002, the Ministry of Finance announced that an
agreement had been reached to abolish the Ministry of Communications and replace it with an
independent authority.
Progress towards this end may be slow, however, because of possible conflicts of interests
between the Ministries of Communications, Finance, and Justice as to how independent the
authority should be. For example, according to the Ha’aretz daily newspaper, the Ministry of
Finance wants continued influence over Bezeq’s regulated tariffs and the allocation of spectrum,
while the Ministry of Justice apparently wants the authority to be a state corporation rather
than an independent authority.
15
The rapid changes in the structure of the telecommunications industry demand that political
considerations be put aside in order to insure that an independent telecommunications will
come into being sooner rather than later.
15 See Hadar Horesh, Ha’aretz, 8/21/2002, ‘The Bottom Line/Those Who Can’t, Do PR,’ online at:
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